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THE ESTATE TAX MARITAL DEDUCfiON FOR A 
"SPECIFIC PORTION" OF AN INTEREST IN TRUST: 
A PROBLEM OF DEFINITION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
· An important measure of relief from the federal estate and gift tax is 
granted to married couples by the marital deduction provisions of section 
2056 of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"). 1 Since passage of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA"),2 bequests to a surviv-
ing spouse are generally deductible in full from the gross estate of the 
decedent, 3 and thus pass to the surviving spouse unburdened by estate 
taxation. Prior to 1981, the marital deduction was available only for 
amounts left to a surviving spouse which did not exceed one-half of the 
decedent's adjusted gross estate.4 While removing the dollar limit on the 
marital deduction has reduced a significant source of estate tax disputes, 
the question of whether a bequest qualifies initially for the marital deduc-
tion is a persistent issue in the post-ERTA p~riod. 
Any bequest left outright to a surviving spouse, with no strings at-
tached, qualifies for the marital deduction. 5 If a bequest is made to a 
trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse, it will qualify for the marital 
deduction only if the surviving spouse has the right to receive the income 
from her interest in the trust and to designate by will the recipient of her 
interest in any trust corpus remaining on her death. 6 When the marital 
deduction statute was first enacted, however, a bequest in trust would fail 
to qualify unless the surviving spouse had the right to all of the trust 
income and a power of appointment over the entire corpus. 7 As a conse-
quence, testators who wanted to make bequests in trust for the benefit of 
both the surviving spouse and other beneficiaries had to establish two 
trusts. Critics of this provision argued that it imposed unnecessary costs 
and administrative burdens on decedents' estates, 8 and as part of the 
1954 revision of the Code,9 the marital deduction was extended to be-
quests to a single trust which provided that a "specific portion" of the 
income was to be paid to the surviving spouse or that the power of ap-
1. I.R.C. § 2056 (1982). 
2. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. 
3. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1982). 
4. I.R.C. § 2056(c) (1954) (repealed 1981). 
5. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1982). To facilitate discussion; it will be assumed that the surviv-
ing spouse is the wife. 
6. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1982). Section 2056(b)(5) also requires that there must be "no 
power in any other person to appoint any part of the interest ... to any person other 
than the surviving spouse." /d. For the qualified terminable interest property ex-
ception to this rule, see infra, text accompanying notes 90-103. 
7. See I.R.C. § 812(e)(1)(F) (1939). 
8. SeeS. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 4891 (legislative history of Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 
Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1668). 
9. Internal Revenue Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, Ch. 736, 68A Stat. 392 (1954). 
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pointment extended to a "specific portion" of the trust. 10 
The application of this provision is explained in Treasury Regula-
tion section 20.2056(b)-5(c), which requires that a specific portion must 
"constitute a fractional or percentile share" of the property interest to 
which the term applies. 11 The validity of the regulation was at issue in 
Northeastern Pennsylvania Nat'/ Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 12 
where the IRS denied the marital deduction to an estate because the tes-
tator failed to use the language required by the regulation in making a 
bequest to his wife of a partial interest in trust income. The Supreme 
Court found that the regulation imposed unwarranted restrictions on the 
marital deduction and ruled that the statute did not require a "specific 
portion" to be expressed by the testator in terms of a fractional or per-
centile share of the trust corpus. 13 
This comment considers whether Northeastern was correctly de-
cided and reviews the impact that the case has had upon the subsequent 
administration of the estate tax marital deduction. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION 
The marital deduction was added to the Internal Revenue Code of 
193914 by section 361 of the Revenue Act o£1948. 15 The primary purpose 
of the marital deduction provisions was to provide uniformity in the tax 
treatment of estates in community property and in common law jurisdic-
tions.16 In community property states, each spouse is deemed to own 
one-half of the marital property outright, whereas in common law states 
property accumulated in the course of a marriage traditionally was con-
sidered to belong to the wage-earner. 17 An important consequence of 
this distinction was that in community property states the marital prop-
erty of the surviving spouse was not included in the estate of the first 
spouse to die. 18 In common law states, however, if the wage-earner died 
10. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1982). For the text of Code section 2056(b)(5), see infra text 
accompanying note 30. 
11. Treas. Reg. § 2056(b)-5(c) (1958). For the text of this regulation, see infra text 
accompanying note 31. 
12. 387 u.s. 213 (1967). 
13. /d. at 218-22. 
14. I.R.C. § 812(e) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 2056 (1982)). At the same time 
that Code section 812(e) was enacted, Code section 811(e)(2) was repealed. The 
repealed provision had determined the extent to which community property held by 
the decedent and his spouse at the death of the decedent was includible in his gross 
estate. After repeal, that determination was controlled by section 812(e). S. REP. 
No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1-2, reprinted in 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. 
SERV. 1163, 1223 [hereinafter 1948 SENATE REPORT]. 
15. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, ch. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117 (1948). 
16. 1948 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 1, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 
1163. 
17. /d., pt. 1, at 26, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 1188. 
18. 1948 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 26, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 
1188; see also Northeastern Pa. Nat'/ Bank & Trust v. United States, 387 U.S. 213, 
219 (1967). 
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before his spouse, it was possible for the marital property to be included 
in his estate, with the result that it was taxed twice: first in the wage-
earner's estate, and then, to the extent that it had not been consumed, in 
his spouse's estate upon her death. 19 In 1948, Congress eliminated this 
jurisdictional imbalance by granting estates in common law states a de-
duction for interests passing to the surviving spouse that did not exceed 
one-half of the adjusted gross estate.20 
Congress viewed this marital deduction measure as a tax deferral 
rather than a tax relief provision: tax would ultimately be imposed upon 
the assets subject to the deduction upon the death of the surviving 
spouse.21 As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Stapf, 22 
The purpose ... is only to permit a married couple's property 
to be taxed in two stages and not to allow a tax-exempt transfer 
of wealth into succeeding generations. Thus the marital deduc-
tion is generally restricted to the transfer of property interests 
that will be includable in the surviving spouse's gross estate.23 
The possibility was acknowledged that the surviving spouse might 
consume the assets during her lifetime and that they therefore would 
never be taxed.24 This possibility also existed in community property 
states, however, and thus the provision was consistent with the intent of 
Congress to eliminate jurisdictional advantages from the administration 
of the estate tax. · 
At the same time that Congress enacted the marital deduction pro-
visions,· it took the further step of extending the deduction to certain life 
estates in trust for the surviving spouse, in recognition of the fact that 
this estate management technique was widely used. 25 To qualify for the 
deduction, the bequest had to give the surviving spouse, at a minimum, 
both a life estate and a general power to appoint the property by will,26 
making her the "virtual owner" of the interest in trust.27 The value of 
the assets controlled by the power given to the surviving spouse, whether 
exercised or not, would subsequently be included in her estate. 28 
19. 1948 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 26, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 
1188. 
20. Compare 1948 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, pt. 1, at 1, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. 
· & ADMIN. SERV. at 1163 (objectives of 1948 marital deduction provisions) with 
GENERAL AND TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE EcONOMIC RECOVERY TAX 
ACT OF 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (June 23, 1981) (objectives of the 1981 
amendments to the marital deduction provisions). See also infra note 88. 
21. ld., pt. 2, at 16, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 1238. 
22. 375 U.S. 118 (1963), reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 981 (1964). 
23. Id. at 128. 
24. 1948 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, pt. 2, at 16, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 
1238. 
25. ld., pt. 1, at 28, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 1190. 
26. I.R.C. § 812(e)(l)(F) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1982)). 
27. 1948 SENATE REPORT, supra note 14, pt. 2, at 16, 1948 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. at 
1238. 
28. I.R.C. § 811(f) (1939) (recodified as amended at I.R.C. § 2041 (1982)). 
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In 1954, Congress amended the marital deduction provisions by 
making the deduction available for bequests t9 a trust where only a por-
tion of the income was to be paid to the surviving spouse and the power 
of appointment extended only to that portion of the trust. 29 Code section 
2056(b)(5) now reads in pertinent part: 
(5) Life estate with power. of. appointment in surviving 
spouse. ---:-In the case of an interest in property passing from the 
decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the 
income from the entire interest, or all the income from a spe-
cific portion thereof, payable annually or at more frequent inter-
vals, with power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire 
interest, or such specific portion (exercisable in favor of such 
surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving spouse ... ), 
and with no power in any other person to appoint any part of 
the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than 
the surviving spouse- . 
(A) the interest or such portion thereof so passing shall, 
for purposes of subsection (a), be considered as passing to the 
surviving spouse . . . . 3o 
Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(c) defines the term "spe-
cific portion" from section 2056(b)(5) as follows: 
A partial interest in prop~rty is not treated as a specific 
portion of the entire interest unless the rights of the surviving 
spouse in income and as to the power constitute afractional or 
percentile share of a property interest so that such interest or 
share in the surviving spouse reflects its proportionate share of the 
increment or decline in the whole of the property interest to 
which the income rights and the power relate. Thus if the right 
of the spouse to income and the power extend to one-half or a 
specified percentage of the property, or the equivalent, the in-
terest is considered as a specific portion. On the other hand, if 
the annual income of the spouse is limited to a specific sum, or 
if she has a power to appoint only a specific sum out of a larger 
fund, the interest is not a deductible interest .... 31 
29. Several lower courts had disqualified these bequests on the grounds that they failed 
to give the surviving spouse "all the income" from the trust and to grant a power to 
appoint the "entire corpus," as required by section 812(e)(1)(F) of the 1939 Code. 
See, e.g., Estate of Shedd v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 1024 (1957); Estate of Sweet v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (lOth 
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956). See also supra text accompanying note 8. 
30. LR.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1982) (emphasis added). 
31. Treas.·Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c) (1958) (emphasis added). 
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TRUST CO. V. UNITED STATES 
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The validity of the requirement of Treasury Regulation section 
20.2056(b)-5(c) that a specific portion be expressed as a fractional or per-
centile share was challenged by the taxpayer in Northeastern Penn-
sylvania National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States. 32 In Northeastern, 
an executor claimed the maximum marital deduction available under the 
estate tax provisions applicable at that time on the grounds that qualified 
interests passing to the wife, either outright or in a marital deduction 
trust, exceeded one half of the gross estate. 33 The will directed the 
trustee of the marital deduction trust: 
(a) ... to pay out of the said income and corpus of the 
said estate unto my wife ... the sum of Three Hundred Dollars 
($300.00) per month for and during the period until my young-
est child reaches the age of eighteen years, and thereafter I di-
rect my Trustee to pay to my wife· . . . the sum of Three 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month for and during the 
rest of her natural life. 
(b) If my wife survives me, she shall have the power, ex-
ercisable by Will, to appoint to her estate, or to others, any or 
all of the principal remaining at the time of her death. 34 
The Commissioner determined that the. trust failed to qualify for the 
marital deduction because the widow's right to the income of the trust 
was not expressed as a "fractional or percentile share" of the total trust 
income, as required by Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(c). 35 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania had given summary judg-
ment for the executor and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had 
reversed and remanded. 36 
32. 235 F. Supp. 941 (M.D. Pa. 1964), rev'd, 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966), rev'd and 
remanded, 387 U.S. 213 (1967). 
33. The decedent's estate tax return showed an adjusted gross estate of $199,750. 
$41,751 of the decedent's assets passed to the widow by operation of law. Distribu-
tions to other beneficiaries amounted to $19,507, leaving a residual estate of 
$138,492. Half of this ($69,246) was left to a trust for the benefit of the wife. Con-
sequently, the wife's interest in the estate amounted to $110,997, but the marital 
deduction covered only one-half of the adjusted gross estate, or $99,875. Northeast-
ern, 387 U.S. at 215-16. 
34. /d. at 216 n.2. 
35. /d. at 216; see also supra text accompanying note 31. 
36. The Supreme Court noted the need to resolve a conflict among the circuits. North-
eastern, 387 U.S. at 217. In Citizens Nat'! Bank v. United States, 359 F.2d 817 (7th 
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 941 (1967), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit permitted the marital deduction under circumstances quite similar to those 
present in Northeastern. Furthermore, in Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544 (2d 
Cir. 1962), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed the deduction for an 
estate where the decedent authorized certain invasions of principal for beneficiaries 
other than the spouse. See also infra note 56. 
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The Supreme Court relied upon the legislative history of the marital 
deduction to find that the intent of Congress in enacting section 
2056(b)(5) was "to afford a liberal 'estate-splitting' possibility to married 
couples."37 It saw no indication 
that Congress-in using the words "all the income from a spe-
cific portion" in the statute, or the equivalent words "a right to 
income ... over ... an undivided part" in the committee re-
ports-intended that the deduction afforded would be defeated 
merely because the "specific portion" or the "undivided part" 
was not expressed by the testator in terms of a "fractional or 
percentile share" of the whole corpus.38 
According to the Court, such an interpretation would "impose unwar-
ranted restrictions upon the availability of the deduction."39 
In addition, the Court specifically rejected the Commissioner's inter-
pretation of the term "virtual owner" that Congress had used in its com-
mentary on the marital deduction legislation.40 The IRS argued that by 
using such a term, Congress meant to ensure that the corpus of a marital 
deduction trust would be taxed upon the death of a surviving spouse to 
the same extent as assets owned outright; and that only by expressing a 
specific portion as a fractional or percentile share could that result be 
achieved.41 In the Court's view, the words "virtual owner" were used in 
the Senate Report chiefly to explain the requirement of section 
2056(b)(5) that there be "no power in any other person to appoint any 
part of the interest, or such specific portion, to any person other than the 
surviving spouse."42 It found no indication that Congress intended the 
deduction to be available only when the surviving spouse received an 
interest equivalent to outright ownership; if that is what Congress had 
intended, the Court reasoned, it would not have permitted any trust to 
qualify.43 
The Court also addressed the question of how the value of the spe-
cific portion qualifying for the marital deduction was to be determined. 
It rejected the idea that the deduction be limited to its annuity value.44 
Instead, the Court determined that the annual stipend the decedent had 
provided for the surviving spouse was to be divided by the current actua-
rial interest rate in order to ascertain the principal required to produce 
37. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 221. 
38. /d. at 220-21 (ellipses in original) (footnote omitted). 
39. /d. at 221. 
40. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text; see also infra note 62. 
41. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 222. 
42. /d.; see also supra text accompanying note 30. 
43. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 222. 
44. /d. at 225. As an example, assuming a 6% interest rate and a surviving spouse with 
a life expectancy of 20 years, the present value of an annuity paying $300 per month 
would be $41,874. The corpus would be consumed over the 20-year payout period. 
See also infra note 46. 
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the income.45 This principal sum would then qualify for the marital 
deduction. 46 
Under the facts of Northeastern, the majority's ruling seems at first 
glance to be entirely reasonable. As the Court observed, and as the IRS 
conceded, no unjust tax avoidance would occur if the deduction were 
allowed on a dollar amount of the corpus of this trust, since the full value 
of the trust would ultimately be taxable in the wife's estate.47 The ruling 
also avoided the harsh aU-or-nothing application of the regulation on an 
estate where it is likely that the testator had intended to take advantage 
of the marital deduction but would lose it because of poor 
draftsmanship. 48 
Justice Stewart, in an emphatic dissent, saw the matter differently.49 
He warned that permitting "specific portion" to be defined as a fixed 
dollar amount would "lead to the ironic and unjustified result of giving 
common-law jurisdictions more favorable tax treatment than community 
property States."50 He illustrated the potential ramifications of the ma-
jority opinion with the following example: 
Assume a trust estate of $200,000, with the widow receiv-
ing the right to the income from $100,000 of its corpus and a 
power of appointment over that $100,000, and the children of 
45. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 224 (citing Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551-52 
(2d. Cir. 1962)). The Court also took exception to the method of computation dis-
cussed by the lower court. /d. at 223. The appellate court had considered applying 
"investment factors" to compute the maximum income that could ever be produced 
by the entire trust corpus, and then determining what fraction of that maximum 
income the required distribution represented, so that the fraction could be applied to 
the entire trust corpus to determine the "specific portion" for marital deduction 
purposes. The appellate court concluded, however, that this computation could not 
be made because "the market conditions for purposes of investment are unknown." 
Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d 476, 484 (3d 
Cir. 1966). Although the appellate court's reasoning is awkward, the decision has 
the merit of considering the likelihood that trust income would grow because trust 
corpus would increase in value. This consideration was ignored by the Supreme 
Court. 
46. If the current actuarial interest rate were 6%, it could be determined that $60,000 
was needed to produce income of $300 per month: 300 X 12 = 3600 + .06 = 
60,000. In Northeastern, $60,000 of the $69,246 bequest in trust would qualify for 
the marital deduction if a 6% interest rate applied. Cf supra note 44. 
47. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 224-25. 
48. Cf Estate of Mittleman v. Commissioner, 522 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In Mit-
tleman, the court held that "[i]n light of the all-pervasive influence of the tax laws 
on estate planning, it seems entirely reasonable for courts to presume, absent con-
trary language, that testamentary provisions in favor of spouses are designed to 
qualify for the marital deduction." /d. at 139. The trust in question directed that 
income be payable "to provide for the proper support, maintenance, welfare and 
comfort" of the testator's wife "for her entire lifetime." /d. at 133 n.l. Although 
this is boilerplate language, the IRS argued that it constituted a limit on the wife's 
right to receive income. The court, citing Northeastern, opted for a more liberal 
reading of the language. /d. at 140. 
49. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 225 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 226 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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the testator receiving income from the balance of the corpus 
during the widow's life, their remainders to vest when she dies. 
Now suppose that when the widow dies the trust corpus has 
doubled in value to $400,000. The wife's power of appointment 
over $100,000 applies only to make $100,000 taxable to her es-
tate. The remaining $300,000 passes tax free to the children. 
Contrast the situation in a community property State. The 
wife's 50% interest in the community property places $200,000 
of the expanded assets in her estate and taxable as such; only 
$200,000, therefore, passes directly to the· children. Thus the 
Court's interpretation of "specific portion" affords common-
law estates a significant tax advantage that community prop-
erty dispositions cannot obtain. 51 
Justice Stewart, like the majority, relied on the legislative history of 
the marital deduction provisions. He observed, however, that instead of 
the generous intent the majority found, the history manifested a clear 
intent to prevent tax avoidance. 52 He also noted that in United States v. 
Stap/, 53 decided only four years earlier, the Court had reached the same 
conclusion. 54 In his view, the only way to prevent tax avoidance in the 
second estate was to retain the ten-year-old definition of specific portion 
contained in the regulation. By requiring the testator to express the sur-
viving spouse's power as a fractional or percentile share of a property 
interest in a trust, the regulation insured that the partial interest would 
reflect its proportionate share of the increment or decline in the entire 
trust. 5 5 
The Court did not respond directly to Justice Stewart's criticisms. 
It did acknowledge that there might be merit to the tax-avoidance argu-
ment if it were applied to a significantly different fact pattern, but con-
cluded that "nothing we hold in this opinion has reference to that quite 
different problem, which is not before us."56 The thrust of the opinion is 
51. /d. at 227 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Under current estate tax law, the unified credit 
shelters up to $600,000 of an estate from taxation. I.R.C. § 2010 (1982). If Justice 
Stewart's figures were multiplied by ten and it .was assumed that the surviving 
spouse had no other assets, the tax on the second community property estate of 
$2,000,000 under the current code would amount to $588,000, while the tax on the 
second common-law estate of $1,000,000 would amount to only $153,000. I.R.C. 
§§ 2001, 2010 (1982). 
52. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 228. 
53. 375 U.S. 118 (1963), reh'g denied, 375 U.S. 981 (1964). 
54. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 228. 
55. /d. 
56. /d. at 225. The Court was alluding to the facts of Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 
544 (2d Cir. 1962), which earlier it had distinguished but not criticized. See supra 
note 45. In Gelb, the wife was given a power of appointment over the entire residual 
trust remaining upon her death, but the trustees, one of whom was the wife, had a 
power to expend $5000 per year of trust funds for the benefit of the decedent's 
youngest daughter. Gelb, 298 F.2d at 545-47. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit found that this power to invade corpus violated the requirement that no 
other person may have power to appoint any part of the corpus to any person other 
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that an intent to liberalize the application of the marital deduction rules 
could be discerned in the legislative history of section 2056(b)(S), and 
therefore that intent should not be thwarted merely because certain 
terms of art are missing. Because the tax avoidance which Justice Stew-
art postulated could not occur in the estate being reviewed, the tax avoid-
ance question was largely ignored. 
Could the Court have meant to give its blessing to the tax loophole 
that Justice Stewart identified? This possibility has not been examined 
rigorously in subsequent cases. Prior to 1982, the few cases that cited 
Northeastern usually did so in dictum, and the issues under consideration 
were generally different from those in Northeastern. 57 One case, Stewart 
v. Usry, 58 touched upon the same issues, but the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit interpreted Northeastern as applying only to trusts where 
the surviving spouse could appoint the entire corpus. 59 
It is difficult to read Northeastern in the limited fashion that the fifth 
circuit suggests. First, if the Supreme Court had meant to say that a 
surviving spouse must have a power over the entire interest in order to 
obtain a marital deduction, it would have rendered redundant the phrase 
"or such specific portion" in the statute. Second, if the Court had meant 
to rule out the marital deduction where the surviving spouse has a power 
of appointment over a specific dollar amount of corpus, it would in effect 
have assigned different meanings to the term "specific portion" as applied 
to income and principal interests: that is, it would mean "ascertainable 
dollar amount"60 when applied to income interests; but "fractional or 
percentile share" when applied to powers of appointment over corpus. 
The deliberateness of the language of the statute makes it unlikely that 
than the surviving spouse. /d. at 547. ·Nevertheless, the appellate court rejected the 
argument that the entire marital deduction should be lost, and found that the term 
"specific portion" could relate to a dollar amount rather than a fractional or percen-
tile share of the corpus. ld. at 549-51. Actuarial methods were to be applied to 
· determine the amount of corpus which could not be invaded and which thus quali-
fied for the deduction. /d. at 550-51. No similar power of invasion was at issue in 
Northeastern. 
57. See, e.g., Alperstein v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 918 (1980); Pennsylvania Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 597 F.2d 
382 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Estate of Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977); Estate of Neugass v. Commissioner, 555 F.2d 
322 (2d Cir. 1977); Estate of Fiedler v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 239 (1976); Estate of 
Smith v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 415 (1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 455 (7th Cir. 1977); see 
also supra note 48. 
58. 399 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1968). 
59. /d. at 57 n.13. In Stewart, the surviving spouse held an imperfect usufruct under 
Louisiana law, and the court determined that it was a terminable interest that failed 
to satisfy the requirements of section 2056(b)(5). /d. 
60. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 229. An "ascertainable dollar amount" would be a pecu-
niary amount to be ascertained by dividing the specified income payment by an 
actuarially determined interest rate. See also Estate of Alexander v. Commissioner, 
82 T.C. 34, 45 (1984) (Chabot, J., concurring), aff'd, 760 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(mem.). 
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Congress intended the term to have two definitions.61 Third, the Court's 
interpretation of the "virtual ownership" language in the legislative his-
tory of section 2056(b)(5) dismisses the idea that Congress intended the 
marital deduction to be available only when the marital deduction trust 
assets reflect the proportionate increase or decrease in the market value 
of those assets that occurred during the surviving spouse's life tenancy.62 
Finally, the Court adopted the actuarial computation methods of the sec-
ond circuit in Gelb v. Commissioner, 63 notwithstanding the fact that Gelb 
permitted a deduction based upon a specific dollar amount of corpus. 64 
These considerations all lead to the conclusion that the Supreme Court 
interpreted section 2056(b)(5) as permitting a "specific portion" to be 
expressed as a dollar amount rather than as a fraction or percent, 
whether applied to interests in income or in corpus. 
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF NORTHEASTERN 
A. Estate of Alexander v. Commissioner 
It was not until seventeen years after Northeastern that a court relied 
on that case to allow a marital deduction for the bequest of a power to 
appoint a specific dollar amount of trust corpus. In Estate of Alexander 
v. Commissioner, 65 the decedent's will directed that his residuary estate 
be placed in trust and that a specific portion be designated the "wife's 
share." The amount of this share was to equal the maximum federal 
estate tax marital deduction available in determining the husband's taxa-
ble estate.66 The wife was to receive all the income from the entire resid-
uary trust and was given the power to appoint the "wife's share" upon 
her death. The IRS disallowed the marital deduction because the be-
quest left the wife with a power to appoint only a specific sum, not a 
fractional or percentile share of the trust. 67 
The Tax Court explicitly stated that the issue for decision was 
"whether a bequest left to a residuary trust, which ... granted [the 
widow] a testamentary power of appointment over a specific dollar 
61. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
62. In Northeastern, the Commissioner argued that the deduction was available only in 
cases where the equivalent of the outright ownership of community property states 
was granted, and that this was what the Senate Report meant by the words "virtual 
owner." Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 222. The Court disagreed, finding instead that 
the words were meant to apply to facts like those in Gelb. /d.; see also supra note 
56. The Court also found "irrelevant" the Government's argument that only a 
grant of the income from a fractional or percentile share would subject the surviving 
spouse to the same fluctuations in the value of the corpus as an outright owner. 
Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 222. 
63. 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962); see also supra note 56. 
64. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 222-24. 
65. 82 T.C. 34 (1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1985) (mem.). 
66. The decedent's adjusted gross estate amounted to $1,078,608.54, and the executor 
sought to qualify one-half of it, or $539,304.27, for the marital deduction. /d. at 36 
n.2. 
67. /d. at 38. 
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amount, qualifie[d] for the Federal estate tax marital deduction."68 Rely-
ing primarily on Northeastern and Gelb, the court sustained the tax-
payer's deduction.69 In particular, it found that 
Congress used the same words 'specific portion,' which we find 
to be unambiguous, in stating the requirements with respect to 
both income and corpus to qualify for the marital deduction. 
Under the circumstances, we cannot say that Congress in-
tended a different meaning to apply to the two categories.70 
The Tax Court squarely confronted the tax avoidance possibilities 
that the IRS identified, but stated that it would have more sympathy for 
the government's position had there not been "so much judicial water 
over the dam" invalidating that position. 71 The court then observed that 
if Congress wanted "specific portion" to be construed as it had been by 
the regulation, Congress could change the language of the statute. 72 
The Alexander court did not address the fact that the will offered an 
alternative method of finding that the testator had satisfied the require-
ments of the regulation. The testator had used a saving clause in his will 
which provided that if the marital deduction was denied for the bequest 
as originally stated, the power of appointment was to be extended to "all 
of the trust principal constituting my Wife's Share as it exists upon the 
68. /d. at 37. 
69. /d. at 44. The court also relied on Estate of Meeske v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 73 
(1979), a.ff'd sub nom. Estate of Laurin v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 8 (6th Cir.l981). 
In Meeske, the will provided that the decedent's estate be· divided into two portions, 
a marital portion and a residual portion, and the surviving spouse was given a power 
of appointment over the entire corpus of the marital portion. Meeske, 72 T.C. at 74-
75. The Commissioner denied the deduction because the amount of the marital 
portion was to be determined by an equalization clause designed to result in the 
lowest estate tax possible on the combined estates, and thus it did not state the 
marital portion as a fraction or percentage of the total residue. /d. at 79-80. The 
Meeske court found for the taxpayer because the wife's rights were in the entire 
specific portion of both the income and corpus. !d. 
70. Alexander, 82 T.C. at 43. 
71. /d. at 39. The court recognized the potential for tax avoidance, observing that: 
[I]f the surviving spouse can appoint only the dollar amount of the interest 
given to her under her deceased spouse's will, only that amount will be 
taxable in her estate under section 2041 and any increment in value of that 
interest between her death and the death of her husband will escape estate 
taxation. 
/d. (footnote omitted). 
72. /d. Despite the tax court's forceful words, some uneasiness with the decision is 
evidenced by the fact that six judges, in concurring opinions, stated that they joined 
the majority only because the consistent application of Northeastern required them 
to do so. /d. at 45-46. Three other judges dissented on the grounds that Treasury 
Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(c) was a reasonable means of implementing the 
statute, and that Northeastern did not invalidate the regulation as applied to a power 
of appointment over corpus. /d. at 47,49 (Simpson, Dawson, & Parker, JJ., dissent-
ing). Even the majority opinion appears to concede that Northeastern might estab-
lish poor tax policy. /d. at 39; see also supra note 71. 
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death of my wife."73 The court might have found that both the regula-
tion and the testator's intent could be satisfied by dividing the current 
dollar amount of the wife's share by the total value of the residuary trust, 
thus arriving at the fractional share of the trust to which the marital 
deduction applied and which would eventually be included in her es-
tate. 74 The Tax Court chose instead to rely on prior case law and to 
insist that the term "specific portion" be consistently defined within the 
statute. As a result, a specific dollar amount of either income or corpus 
was found to satisfy the "specific portion" terminology of the statute. 75 
B. The Commissioner's Response to Northeastern and Alexander. 
In spite of the Supreme Court's clear statement that it found "no 
warrant ... in common sense or in the statute and its history" for the 
Commissioner's argument that "specific portion" must be expressed as a 
fractional or percentile share of the entire corpus of a marital deduction 
trust, 76 the IRS has tenaciously clung to the language of its regulation. 
To the extent that the-Service has recognized Northeastern, it has limited 
the application of the holding to bequests of dollar-denominated interests 
in trust income.77 No attempt was made to acknowledge the Court's 
modification of the definition of "specific portion" until the passage of 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 prompted a review of all regula-
tions under Code section 2056.78 
Proposed Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5(c)79 purports to 
define the term "specific portion" in a manner that would conform to the 
definition established by Northeastern. 80 Nevertheless, the amended reg-
ulation contains the familiar requirement that a specific portion must 
constitute a fractional or percentile share of a property interest "so that 
73. Alexander, 82 T.C. at 36 (emphasis added). Without the saving clause, there would 
be a danger that the court would modify the bequest in a manner not intended by 
the testator, i.e., by granting the surviving spouse a power to appoint either more or 
less, depending on the market value of the trust on the date of her-death, than the 
dollar equivalent of the maximum federal estate tax marital deduction available to 
the estate. 
74. For a similar computation under I.R.C. section 2056(b)(7), see infra text accompa-
nying note 100. 
75. Alexander, 82 T.C. at 40-44. 
76. Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 221-22. 
77. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 8528009 (April 5, 1985). This memorandum provides in per-
tinent part: 
Although this regulation was held to be invalid as it pertains to a right to 
receive the income from a specific portion of an entire interest in North-
eastern ... , the Service has argued that the regulation continues to be valid 
as it pertains to a power to appoint a specific portion of the entire interest. 
ld.; see also Estate of Alexander v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 34 (1984). Note that this 
memorandum was issued shortly before the fourth circuit's affirmation of 
Alexander. 
78. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,350 (May 17, 1984). 
79. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c), 49 Fed. Reg. 21,355 (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. § 20.2056(b)-5(c)) (proposed May 17, 1984). 
80. 49 Fed. Reg. 21,350, 21,352 (May 17, 1984). 
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such interest or share in the surviving spouse reflects its proportionate 
share of the increment or decline in the whole of the property interest to 
which the income rights and the power relate."81 Even though the 
Supreme Court dismissed the Service's argument that Congress intended 
the interest of the surviving spouse to be subject to the same fluctuations 
in the value of the corpus as an outright owner, 82 the IRS persists in 
reiterating that language as the rationale for the "fractional or percentile 
share" requirement. 
Recognition of the Northeastern rule appears in a newly-added para-
graph83 that is consistent with the Service's narrow interpretation of 
Northeastern. The focus of the new material is on the rule that the de-
ductible interest is computed by applying the then-applicable annuity in-
terest rate to the amount of income payable to the surviving spouse. 
While the language of the proposed regulation is reasonably straightfor-
ward, the examples explaining the application of the regulation are based 
on a curiously unlikely fact pattern that invites the argument that the 
regulation is to be narrowly applied. 84 No example directly confronts the 
question that Northeastern left unanswered, that is, whether the marital 
deduction is to be allowed where the surviving spouse is given a right to 
81. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c)(2). 
82. See Northeastern, 387 U.S. at 222. See also supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
83. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c)(3) provides: 
A specific sum payable annually ... that is not limited by the income 
of the property will be treated as a right to the income of a specific portion 
of the property. However, no deduction will be allowable under section 
2056(b)(5) except to the extent that the surviving spouse has the required 
power of appointment over a fractional or a percentile share of the prop-
erty. The deductible interest ... is the specific portion of the property 
that, assuming the interest rate generally applicable for the valuation of 
annuities at the time of the decedent's death, would produce income equal 
to such specific annual payment .... 
84. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c)(5), 49 Fed. Reg. 21,355 (published May 17, 
1984), examples 1-3. These examples were based on the facts that the decedent 
transferred to a trustee "500 identical shares of X company stock," and that the 
surviving spouse was given an interest in one-half of the trust income or $6,000, 
whichever amount was larger. In examples (1) and (2), the power of appointment 
extended to a fractional share of the trust corpus and thus the marital deduction was 
permitted to the extent of the smaller interest. In example (3) the marital deduction 
is disallowed, as follows: 
Assume that the facts are the same as the example (1) except that S's 
testamentary general power of appointment is exercisable over the sum of 
$160,000 .... Inasmuch as there is no certainty as to what portion of the 
stock will be valued at $160,000 on S's death, the power of appointment 
over $160,000 is not considered a power of appointment over a specific 
portion of the entire interest. 
/d., example 3. The significance of the fact that the testamentary transfer was of 
"500 identical shares of X company stock" is not explained. The unnecessary speci-
ficity of the testamentary transfer combined with the complexity of the income in-
terest given to the surviving spouse establishes the rule that the marital deduction 
may be denied for a power to appoint a specific sum from a larger trust by means of 
an example which is unlikely to apply to any specific estate. 
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all the income from a specific dollar amount of corpus. It is difficult to 
understand why the IRS sidesteped the issue. 
The IRS cannot be faulted for failing to take cognizance of the Tax 
Court decision in Alexander that was handed down just five months 
before the regulation was promulgated, 85 especially in light of the Ser-
vice's subsequent appeal. With the affirmance of Alexander by the Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, it is clear that the difference 
in interpretation of the term "specific portion" by the IRS and the courts 
cannot be ignored. Despite the announced attempt to conform the regu-
lations to the statute as the statute was interpreted in Northeastern, the 
IRS would face considerable litigation risk in arguing that the statute 
requires a specific portion to be expressed as a fraction or percent of a 
larger interest. 86 
C. "Specific Portion" and the Qualified Terminable Interest 
Property Rules 
Congress had an opportunity to shed some light on the meaning of 
"specific portion" when it amended Code section 2056 in the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ER TA"). 87 The amendment repealed the 
limitations on the marital deduction under former law and introduced 
new rules applicable to life interests granted to the surviving spouse. 88 
Congress used the same "specific portion" terminology in newly-added 
Code section 2056(b)(7) as occurs in Code section 2056(b)(5).89 Unfortu-
nately, Congress did not define the term either in the statute or in its 
legislative history. 
ER T A not only provided for the unlimited tax-free transfer of assets 
85. The Alexander decision was filed on January 5, 1984. 82 T.C. 34. 
86. Despite the divided opinion of the tax court in Alexander, the majority expressed 
considerable irritation with the Commissioner's "rigid" definition of specific portion 
and quoted with satisfaction its ruling on a different matter in an earlier case: 
It appears that the respondent, after losing in the courts and after 
failing to persuade Congress to adopt [his] approach, enshrined his litigat-
ing position as a regulation. We cannot now sanction a position which has 
already been so thoroughly repudiated. 
Alexander, 82 T.C. 34, 44 (citing Edward L. Stephenson Trust v. Commissioner, 81 
T.C. 283, 299 (1983)). 
87. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d)(l), 95 Stat. 172, 
302 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982 & West. Supp. 1988). 
88. The purposes of the amendment were to enable couples in common law states to 
obtain a tax-free inter vivos division of their property; to eliminate the problem of 
determining the includable portion of jointly-held property, particularly a couple's 
home, when both spouses may have provided consideration for it; and to eliminate 
the need for smaller estates to engage in complex estate planning in order to mini-
mize taxes. The overriding objective of the change was to treat the husband and 
wife as a single economic unit and to ensure that only one transfer tax was imposed 
on family wealth passing to the next generation. GENERAL AND TECHNICAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
39 (June 23, 1981). 
89. Compare I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982 & West Supp. 1988) with I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) 
(1982). 
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between spouses, it also introduced rules allowing testators who want to 
control the disposition of assets upon the death of the surviving spouse to 
obtain a marital deduction for certain life interests in trust even when the 
surviving spouse is given no power to appoint the corpus during her life-
time or at death.90 If the trust qualifies as Qualified Terminable Interest 
Property ("QTIP"),91 estate taxes are not imposed until the death of the 
surviving spouse, when the property is taxed as if it were an asset of her 
estate.92 QTIP tax treatment is also available to testators in community 
property states, who can obtain a marital deduction on non-community 
property in which the surviving spouse is given a qualifying life 
interest. 93 
The QTIP rules, like the standard marital deduction rules, allow 
testators to establish a single residual trust permitting a partial QTIP 
election, rather than separate QTIP and residual trusts. 94 This provision 
90. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(d)(l), 95 Stat. 172, 
302 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1982 & West Supp. 1988)). 
91. To be qualified terminable interest property, the trust must give the surviving spouse 
an interest for life to all the income from the property, payable annually or at more 
frequent intervals, and provide that no person, including the surviving spouse, may 
have a power to appoint any part of the property to any person other than the 
surviving spouse during his or her lifetime. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 
1988). The statute applies to annuities as well, stating that "[t]o the extent pro-
vided in the regulations, an annuity shall be treated in a manner similar to an in-
come interest in property (regardless of whether the property from which the 
annuity is payable can be separately identified)." !d. (flush language); see also Prop. 
Treas. Reg.§ 20.2056(b)-7(c)(2) and (e), example 12, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,356 (proposed 
May 17, 1984); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8446006 (no date given). 
92. See I.R.C. § 2044 (1982). The decedent's estate is entitled to recover the taxes paid 
by the estate from the recipient of the property. I.R.C. § 2207A (1982). 
93. Subject to the limitations of Code section 2056(b) pertaining to life estates or other 
terminable interests, the marital deduction is applicable to any interest in property 
which passes to the surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056(a) (1982). 
The QTIP rules have given testators great flexibility in arranging testamentary 
transfers in order to limit the impact of the estate tax. The rules permit a personal 
representative to make a post-mortem election to treat certain property as "passing 
to the surviving spouse" in order to achieve the optimum disposition of estate assets 
for tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(A) (1982). Consequently it is no longer 
necessary for a testator to fine-tune instructions in his will as to the balance between 
restricted and unrestricted gifts to his spouse. The personal representative may base 
his decision about QTIP election on such factors as the change in asset values since 
the time the will was made, the other assets which will be taxable in the estate of the 
surviving spouse, the likelihood of change in value while the assets are held in trust, 
and the probable longevity of the surviving spouse. The first objective is to ensure 
that good use is made of the unified credit, which for decedents dying after 1986 
effectively exempts $600,000 of the assets of each estate from taxation. See I.R.C. 
§ 2010 (1982 & West Supp. 1988). Where the combined estates of the decedent and 
the surviving spouse are worth more than $1,200,000, the personal representative 
may attempt to equalize the estates so that together they are taxed in the lowest 
possible brackets. He then makes an irrevocable election on the estate tax return to 
claim the marital deduction for all or a portion of the trust assets. See I.R.C. § 2056 
(b)(7)(B)(v) (1982); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 22.2056-1 (1982). 
94. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(iv) (1982); Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2056(b)-7(b), 49 Fed. Reg. 
21,356 (proposed May 17, 1984). 
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is attractive from an administrative point of view. For testators who take 
advantage of the provision, the interpretation of the "specific portion" 
terminology of the statute and regulations will continue to have signifi-
cant tax consequences. 95 
When Proposed Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-7 was 
promulgated as part of the 1984 revision of the section 2056 regulations, 
it echoed the requirement of the old regulations that a specific portion 
"relate to a fractional or percentile share of the property so that [it] will 
reflect its proportionate share of the increment or decline in the whole of 
the property . . . . "96 The validity of the requirement is as questionable 
in the new regulation is as it was in the earlier one. To date, however, no 
litigation has tested whether the interpretation of "specific portion" that 
developed in Northeastern and Alexander is to be extended to QTIP 
trusts. 
If the Northeastern/ Alexander interpretation prevails, executors 
may conclude that they have a duty to minimize estate taxes by stating 
the terms of a QTIP election in a manner that is consistent with those 
cases. Imagine, for example, an adjusted gross estate of $1,200,000, all to 
go to a residual trust for the benefit of a surviving spouse. Applying 
Northeastern and Alexander, the executor would choose QTIP treatment 
of the specific sum of $600,000 rather than of one-half of the residual 
trust. The marital deduction and unified credit would shelter the dece-
dent's estate from taxes. If the value of the trust were to grow to 
$2,400,000 by the time of the surviving spouse's death, then according to 
Alexander, only the $600,000 on which the marital deduction was based 
would be includable in her estate. If she had no other assets, the unified 
credit would shelter her $600,000 estate from taxes. Thus, $2,400,000 
would pass to their legatees undiminished by taxes. In contrast, had the 
executor elected QTIP treatment for "one-half" of the $1,200,000 trust 
rather than for the specific dollar sum of $600,000, the full $1,200,000 
would be includable in the surviving spouse's estate and only $600,000 of 
that amount wouid be sheltered by the unified credit. The estate tax due 
on the top $600,000 would be $235,000.97 
95. Proposed Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b )-7 goes to even greater lengths 
than does Treasury Regulation section 20.2056(b)-5 to make clear that a "specific 
portion" must bear its share of the increment or decline in value of a larger residual 
trust. Compare Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,355 (proposed 
May 17, 1984) with Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (1958). Proposed section 
20.2056(b)-7 requires that if the marital deduction portion of the trust is severed, it 
must be clear "by virtue of the duties imposed on the fiduciary either by applicable 
state law or by the express or implied provisions of the instrument governing the 
trust" that the fiduciary must divide the trust according to the fair market value of 
the trust assets at the time of division. The state law issue usually is whether the 
surviving spouse's power of appointment would extend to shares of stock distributed 
in a stock split. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(c), example 2 (1958). 
96. Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 20.2056(b)-7, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,356 (proposed May 17, 1984) (to 
be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 20.2056(b)-7). 
97. The tentative tax on an estate of $1,200,000 is $427,800. I.R.C. § 2001 (1982). The 
1988]. Estate Tax Marital Deduction 161 
Private Letter Ruling 8301050 indicates the approach the IRS is 
likely to take toward QTIP elections for partial interest in a residual 
trust. 98 The executor to whom the ruling was addressed sought to qual-
ify the amount of residual trust property which would reduce the tax on 
the testator's estate to zero, after taking into account the unified credit 
and other allowable deductions. The executor requested a ruling that 
"the fractional share of the proposed election will constitute qualified ter-
minable property." The IRS ruled that the partial election was valid 
under Temporary Treasury Regulation section 22.2056-1 99 and in-
structed the executor on the method of determining the fractional share: 
the numerator was to be the smallest amount that would, after taking 
into account all credits and deductions, result in no federal estate tax 
being imposed on the decedent's estate, while the denominator would be 
the value of the trust corpus as finally determined for federal estate tax 
purposes, less any items such as specific bequests, taxes, and debts that 
the testator instructed be paid out of the trust fund. 100 It further stated 
that the same fractional share of the residual trust would be taxable to 
the surviving spouse or the surViving spouse's estate under Code section 
2044. 101 . 
In this private letter ruling, the executor complied with both the 
spirit and the letter of the regulation by expressing the "specific portion" 
as a fraction. What remains unclear is whether an election which ex-
pressed the specific portion simply as a dollar amount, as Alexander sub-
sequently permitted in 1984, would qualify for the marital deduction, 
and if it did qualify, whether such an election would limit the amount 
eventually taxable in the estate of the surviving spouse to that dollar 
amount. 
It is difficult to see how the courts could object to the tax treatment 
proposed in Private Letter Ruling 8301050 as applied to a QTIP election 
of a dollar-amount "specific portion." Harsh results are avoided because 
the marital deduction is permitted. The tax consequences are fair and 
reasonable, and tax avoidance is prevented when the surviving spouse 
subsequently dies. The tax determination does not require interpretation 
of any testamentary language, nor does it in any way affect the ultimate 
disposition of trust assets, since the surviving spouse has no power to 
appoint corpus in any event. 102 Nevertheless, application of this ruling 
unified credit of $192,800 reduces the tax imposed to $235,000. I.R.C. § 2010 
(1982). 
98. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8301050 (Sept. 30, 1982). 
99. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 22.2056-1 (1982). 
100. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8301050 (Sept. 30, 1982). 
101. !d. 
102. Cf. Estate of Alexander v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 34 (1984), aff'd 160 F.2d 264 
(4th Cir. 1985) (mem.). In Alexander, the wife's power of appointment would have 
been limited, in the absence of the saving clause, to the amount deducted in her 
husband's estate, regardless of whether there was appreciation in the value of the 
total trust. It is reasonable to conclude that the testator intended this limitation; 
otherwise, he could simply have used the language of the saving clause to define the 
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to an estate seeking the benefits of the Alexander holding103 would con-
flict with the Tax Court's emphatic dismissal of the IRS's interpretation 
of the term "specific portion," and would establish the dual definition 
that the Tax Court sought to avoid. 
V. THE FUTURE OF NORTHEASTERN AND ALEXANDER 
If the amount of litigation that has arisen in the wake of Northeast-
ern is a guide, the unmistakable loophole opened up by that decision has 
not led to the tax avoidance that Justice Stewart anticipated. With the 
notable exception of Alexander, no published case has attempted to ex-
tend the Northeastern rule to a "specific portion" of corpus expressed as a 
dollar amount rather than as a fractional or percentile share, nor has any 
published opinion dealt with an effort to avoid taxes in the estate of the 
surviving spouse by reliance on Northeastern or Alexander. Although 
one can only speculate on the meaning of an absence of litigation, there 
may have been a certain number of estates that have argued the North-
eastern/ Alexander definition of "specific portion" where the IRS con-
cluded that it was unlikely to succeed in insisting upon the validity of the 
definition set forth in its regulations. Whatever the explanation, the tax-
saving possibilities of Alexander have not been overlooked. 104 It seems 
probable that before long a personal representative will argue that only a 
specific sum is includable in the estate of a surviving spouse, and the 
resulting tax avoidance will compel a higher court to consider whether 
Alexander was correctly decided by the Tax Court. The inquiry will lead 
to the question of whether Congress intended that the term "specific por-
tion" be consistently defined, and if so, whether the majority or dissent-
ing view in Northeastern best expressed that definition. 
Unquestionably the result sought by the IRS in Northeastern was a 
harsh one: merely because a testator failed to employ the precise termi-
nology of a treasury regulation (not a statute) in his will, his estate was 
faced with having to pay thousands of additional dollars of federal estate 
scope of her power. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. It is not difficult to 
imagine a situation where "wife's share" terminology was used without a similar 
saving clause, and where the testator's sole intent was to prevent dissipation of trust 
assets during the surviving spouse's lifetime, not to restrict her power of appoint-
ment at death. In such a case, strict application of the marital deduction rules 
would require the deduction to be denied even though the objectives of the statute 
were satisfied. As a rule, courts will not inquire into taxpayer intent, but the rule is 
sometimes overlooked. See, e.g., Estate of Mittleman v. Commissioner, 522 F.2d 
132 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also supra at note 37. 
103. The dispute with the IRS could arise either when the personal representative of the 
first estate sought to qualify the bequest for QTIP treatment or when the personal 
representative of the second estate argued that only the dollar amount on which the 
QTIP marital deduction was based was includable in that estate. 
104. See, e.g., Engel, Tax Court's Decision in Alexander Creates Significant But Risky 
Planning Opportunity, 60 J. TAX'N 270 (1984). Writing before Alexander was ap-
pealed, the author stated that if the case were upheld, the estate planning technique 
that it offered would probably become prevalent. 
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taxes. Testators fortunate enough to have more skillful draftsmen would 
have avoided the taxes merely by changing the form of a bequest, not its 
substance. Perhaps it was because no tax avoidance was possible under 
the facts of the case that the Supreme Court brushed aside the issues 
Justice Stewart raised. His interpretation of the meaning of "specific por-
tion" is nonetheless compelled by a logical reading of the statute and its 
legislative history. 
There is no principle of statutory construction which would permit 
a court both to avoid harsh results in situations like Northeastern or Al-
exander and to avoid creating a tax loophole. Unless the term "specific 
portion" is given two different meanings as it is used within a single sen-
tence of a statute, one objective or the other must fail. The proposed 
amendments to the regulation's definition of the term will prevent tax 
avoidance, but only by means of an interpretation which the courts re-
ject. Congress must shed some light on the question. Northeastern's defi-
nition of "specific portion" could be codified as it applies to partial 
income interests where the surviving spouse has power to appoint the 
entire corpus or where the corpus is capable of being expressed as a frac-
tional share of a larger fund, 105 because no tax avoidance will occur in 
those situations. Furthermore, with QTIP elections Congress should 
make it clear that the amount of a "specific portion" includable in the 
estate of the second spouse must be expressed as a fraction or percent of a 
larger trust, in a manner consistent with Private Letter Ruling 8301050. 
For the traditional marital trust, however, the Code must require that a 
specific portion be expressed as a fractional or percentile share of trust 
corpus. 
This treatment of the statute would still lead to harsh results in ordi-
nary marital deduction cases like Alexander, where the surviving spouse 
has a power to appoint less than the entire trust corpus and the drafts-
man fails to express the "specific portion" as a fraction or percentile 
share or to provide ·a saving clause like the one found in Alexander. The 
number of testators who would be affected by a revised rule, however, is 
probably negligible. The traditional marital trust is still a valuable tool 
in certain estate plans, 106 but the alternative of the QTIP trust greatly 
reduces the average testator's need to use it. Codification of the "frac-
tional or percentile share" rules will work a hardship on the few estates 
where the testator had the misfortune to employ an inept draftsman for a 
marital trust. Nevertheless, the fair administration of the federal estate 
105. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6 (1958); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(c)(2) (pro-
posed May 17, 1984) (to be codified at 20 C.P.R. § 20.2056(b)-7(c)(2)). 
106. The traditional marital trust will still be a useful estate planning device where a 
testator wants to keep certain assets in trust but to give his spouse an unconditional 
power to appoint all or a portion of the property by will, or where he wants to avoid 
discretionary determinations by his personal representative. 
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tax requires recognition of the logic and consistency of the original defi-
nition of "specific portion" as it applies to interests in trust corpus. 
Louise S. Hertz 
